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Future thinking in older adults is characterised by a lack of specificity of imagined events and by 
an equal or even higher subjective experience, compared to younger adults. We considered 
whether this lack of specificity stemmed partly from the avoidance of a somewhat disturbing 
future and then examined the extent to which certain types of emotion-regulation strategies, 
namely positive reappraisal and positive refocusing, contributed to the subjective experience of 
future thinking. Middle-aged and older adults completed an adapted version of the AMT, in 
which temporal distance and cue word valence were manipulated, thus resulting in future 
conditions assumed to represent varying degrees of discomfort. Results indicate that distant 
future and negative cues restricted both the specificity and the subjective experience of future 
thinking. In addition, the use of avoidance strategies predicted the nature of future thoughts in 
the context of a supposed uncomfortable future (i.e., a distant future induced by negative cues), 
although it followed quite different age-related patterns. Together with the findings that positive 
reappraisal and positive refocusing (to a lesser extent) contributed to the subjective experience of 
future thinking, this study indicates that how individuals imagine their personal future also relies 
on affect- and emotion-regulation strategies. 
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Projecting oneself into the future by mentally pre-experiencing scenarios that are likely to 
occur in the near or distant future is a highly evolved adaptive function (Miloyan & Suddendorf, 
2015; Tulving, 2005). This ability is strongly linked to the capacity to recall memories (for a 
review, see Klein, 2013). Among the numerous similarities between these two kinds of mental 
time travel is the way they are affected by aging (for a review, see Schacter, Gaesser, & Addis, 
2012). In particular, older adults exhibit difficulties generating specific future events (i.e., unique 
events, precisely located in time and lasting no more than a day, such as “going to the theatre 
tomorrow evening”; cf. Williams et al., 1996). Concurrently with this age-related lack of 
specificity (e.g., Abram, Picard, Navarro, & Piolino, 2014; Gallo, Korthauer, McDonough, 
Teshale, & Johnson, 2011), older adults, as compared to younger ones, rate their representations 
of future events as associated with an equal or even stronger subjective experience (e.g., De 
Brigard et al., 2016; Johnson, Kuhl, Mitchell, Ankudowich, & Durbin, 2015). The present study 
was designed to investigate whether affective factors account for this age-related pattern of 
future thinking by addressing, first, the lack of specificity, and second, the subjective experience 
of future thinking.  
Several cognitive factors have been identified as contributing to the age-related 
weakening in future thinking, including executive functions, working memory and visuospatial 
processing (Cole, Morrison, & Conway, 2013; Zavagnin, De Beni, Borella, & Carretti, 2015). 
These factors may, at least partly, account for elderly people’s reduced ability to extract stored 
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information from episodic memory and recombine it into future mental representations (Schacter 
& Addis, 2007).  
In addition to these cognitive factors, studies conducted in both clinical and non-clinical 
samples have shown that other individual differences, and particularly proneness to avoidance, 
induce a reduced specificity of remembered memories (e.g., Debeer et al., 2012; Debeer, Raes, 
Williams, & Hermans, 2011; Geraerts, Dritschel, Kreplin, Miyagawa, & Waddington, 2012; 
Hauer, Wessel, & Merckelbach, 2006; Hermans, Defranc, Raes, Williams, & Eelen, 2005; Raes, 
Hermans, de Decker, Eelen, & Williams, 2003; Raes, Hermans, Williams, & Eelen, 2006). One 
account of this reduced specificity is the affect regulation hypothesis (Williams, 1996; see 
Williams et al., 2007), which proposes that, by adopting a less specific memory retrieval style, 
one might escape the affective and emotional effect of memories and that the search for specific 
events in memory is aborted to avoid harmful consequences (Williams, 1996). Hence, this 
hypothesis posits that reduced memory specificity serves an avoidance function (Hermans et al., 
2008; Raes et al., 2003; Raes et al., 2006; Williams, 1996). Although a few studies have shown 
that this hypothesis also applies to the imagination of future events, particularly in repressors, 
who are assumed to avoid, ignore or dismiss strong emotions and exhibit a lack of specificity of 
imagined events (Dickson & Bates, 2005; Dickson, Moberly, Hannon, & Bates, 2009), the 
question has not yet been raised as to whether the functional avoidance hypothesis also applies to 
the imagination of future events in older adults, and more specifically whether the lack of 
specificity of their future representations stems partly from a strategy to avoid certain disturbing 
events that may await them in their personal future.  
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In fact, inviting older adults to project themselves into their personal future is far from 
trivial. The progression through life is associated with a narrowing of one’s time perspective, that 
is, one’s sense of future time remaining to live is reduced (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 
1999; Lang & Carstensen, 2002). In addition, the preferred focus is on the past rather than the 
future, as the latter has less positive implications (Webster & Ma, 2013). Moreover, the limited 
time perspective in elderly people is commonly described as including a higher likelihood of 
negative events (e.g., Bohn, 2010; Lazarus & DeLongis, 1983). When young and older adults list 
the most important events in the normal life course and the expected timing of these events, both 
generations agree that negative events (e.g., one’s own death, the partner’s death or serious 
disease) are more likely to occur in old age, whereas positive events (e.g., having a child or 
getting married) are more likely to occur in early adulthood (Bohn, 2010). Therefore, inviting 
older adults to think about their distant personal future not only requires them to consider the 
limits of their future perspective but might also confront them with a series of inescapable and 
threatening situations. One might therefore wonder whether older adults tend to avoid projecting 
themselves into their personal future when they are asked to in experimental settings and whether 
this avoidance of future scenarios accounts for the loss of specificity discussed above. 
Addressing these issues constituted the first aim of this study.  
The second objective was to investigate the possibility that certain emotion-regulation 
strategies account for the subjective experience of future thinking. Older adults’ memories and 
prospections have been shown to be rated as more personally significant and emotionally intense 
(Abram et al., 2014; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008; Rubin & Berntsen, 2009; Schlagman, 
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Schulz, & Kvavilashvili, 2006) and more vivid (e.g., Cole et al., 2013; Comblain, D’Argembeau, 
& Van der Linden, 2005; Gallo et al., 2011; Janssen, Rubin, & St. Jacques, 2011; McDonough & 
Gallo, 2013; Rubin & Berntsen, 2009) than younger adults’ memories and prospections. To 
explain this age-related difference in the subjective experience of mental time travel, it has been 
proposed that young adults rate the vividness of their experiences by focusing on visual 
information, whereas older adults are more prone to base their ratings on the emotional value of 
the events than on their episodic attributes (Johnson et al., 2015). This tendency to rely on the 
emotional value of the events may result in older adults rating many attributes of their future 
thoughts higher, especially as meaningful events have been shown to be associated with a greater 
feeling of pre-experiencing (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2012). We argue that basing the 
subjective rating on the emotional value of an event requires older adults to appraise personal 
events more favourably than younger adults by applying some emotion regulation strategies.  
The idea that emotion regulation influences the subjective experience of past and future 
thinking is not new but it has never been studied in the context of ageing. Indeed, in young 
adults, individual differences in emotion regulation have been shown to influence the subjective 
experience accompanying mental time travel; for instance, the use of expressive suppression 
leads to a reduced subjective experience (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006; Richards & 
Gross, 2000). In older adults, it has only been shown that past experiences were reappraised in a 
positive light (Comblain et al., 2005; Schryer & Ross, 2014). Since it is known that positive 
future events contain more sensory details and are associated with clearer representations of 
contextual details and stronger feelings of pre-experiencing (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 
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2004; de Vito, Neroni, Gamboz, Della Sala, & Brandimonte, 2015; Painter & Kring, 2015; 
Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013), one could assume that the higher subjective experience in older 
adults may be related to their positive enhancement of future events. We shall therefore 
investigate whether positive reappraisal (i.e., revisiting emotional responses by reassessing the 
meaning of the stimulus as valuable or beneficial) and positive refocusing (i.e., replacing 
negative emotions with positive and pleasant ones) – both of which strategies are used more 
easily by older adults (Lohani & Isaacowitz, 2014; Nowlan, Wuthrich, & Rapee, 2015; Phillips, 
Henry, Hosie, & Milne, 2008; Shiota & Levenson, 2009) – contribute to the stronger subjective 
feelings associated with prospection in older adults. 
Thus, this study seeks, first, to investigate the pattern of future thinking using a modified 
version of the autobiographical memory task (AMT; Williams et al., 1996) in middle-aged and 
older adults, with both the temporal distance and the emotional valence of cue words being 
manipulated. Cue words with emotional valence have been shown to enhance access to 
memories and prospections with a similar emotional valence (Gallo et al., 2011; Young, 
Erickson, & Drevets, 2012). In addition, the use of the fairly distant future (i.e., 5 years from the 
present) was expected to confront older adults with the limits of their future perspective. 
Manipulating both the valence and the temporal distance allowed us to generate future conditions 
presenting varying degrees of discomfort. Thus, the most uncomfortable future condition was 
assumed to correspond to a distant future induced by negative cue words, and this stressful 
condition was expected to enhance the use of avoidance strategies, particularly in older adults.  
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Proneness to avoidance was assessed with two questionnaires, the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011) and the Questionnaire d’Évitement Cognitif (CAQ; 
Gosselin et al., 2002) in order to examine whether the reduced specificity of future thinking was 
related to particular types of avoidance strategies. It has been shown that, in healthy participants, 
less specific autobiographical memories correlate with a variety of thoughts, feelings and even 
situation avoidance strategies (Hermans et al., 2005). The AAQ-II is a measure of experiential 
avoidance, which refers to the general tendency of individuals to feel uncomfortable and 
enmeshed in their own internal experiences, and which has previously been used in studies 
investigating the relationship between avoidance and less specific memories (Hermans et al., 
2005; Kashdan, Breen, Afram, & Terhar, 2010; Raes, Williams, & Hermans, 2009; Spinhoven, 
Bamelis, Molendijk, Haringsma, & Arntz, 2009). On the other hand, the CAQ, which has also 
been shown to be correlated with reduced memory specificity in clinical and non-clinical 
samples (Gandolphe, Nandrino, Hancart, & Vosgien, 2013), assesses the extent to which 
individuals resort to cognitive strategies to escape disturbing experiences.  
We hypothesised that older adults would provide less specific, more general future events 
and more omission-type responses (i.e., failure to respond or responses consisting in semantic 
associates that neither refer to an event nor are future-oriented). Applying the functional 
avoidance hypothesis regarding memories to the imagination of future events, we expected that 
the participants who produced less specific responses would have a higher propensity to be 
avoidant in a particularly uncomfortable condition (i.e., thinking of a distant future induced by 
negative cue words). We also hypothesised that, in this particular condition, the more avoidant 
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older participants would attempt not to project themselves into the future and would thus produce 
more omission-type responses.  
The second objective of this study was to investigate the contribution of positive 
refocusing and positive reappraisal to the ratings for subjective experience of imagined future 
events. Following the imagination of future events in the modified AMT, participants were 
invited to rate the characteristics of their subjective experience (i.e., emotion, visual details, 
vividness, importance, and feeling of experiencing), and individual differences in the use of 
positive refocusing and positive reappraisal were assessed. We expected older adults to report 
higher ratings for most phenomenal qualities and hypothesised that positive reappraisal and 
positive refocusing would contribute to the age-related differences in the subjective qualities of 
future events. In other words, we expected that the participants who were most inclined to use 
these two emotion regulation strategies would give higher ratings to the phenomenological 
qualities of their future representations.  
Finally, the sample in the present study consisted of middle-aged and older adults, 
contrasting with the vast majority of previous studies on future thinking in ageing, which usually 
compared older adults to young adults (generally aged between 18 and 30). Yet, most events 
deemed to be important and “central to the life story” occur in early adulthood, that is, between 
the ages of 15 and 30 (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2002, 2004; Bohn, 2010). These highly positive 
events may therefore be the ones young adults are most likely to imagine when they are 
prompted to project themselves into their personal future, whereas middle-aged adults may be 
more likely to have already experienced these events. The use of middle-aged rather than young 
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adults as a control group was intended to overcome this plausible bias toward generating highly 
positive events in the future while still allowing us to preserve the difference in future temporal 
perspectives between middle-aged and older adults. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 51 middle-aged adults (26 females; ranging from 35 to 45 years, 
M = 39.5, SD = 3.5) and 49 older adults (26 females; ranging from 65 to 75 years, M = 69.4, SD 
= 2.8) from France and Switzerland, who were contacted by convenience sampling at 
community/associative centres and at various workplaces. Two older adults were excluded from 
the data analysis because their number of omission responses in the Specificity Thinking Task 
exceeded the mean of their group by more than 2 SD. The middle-aged adults were active in the 
workforce, whereas the older adults were retired but actively involved at least twice a week in 
various social activities (e.g., volunteering). Middle-aged and older adults were matched for 
education (i.e., number of years in school since the age of six; M = 16.4 years, SD = 2.3, and M 
=15.9 years, SD = 2.4, respectively; t(99) = 1.02, p = 0.31). None of the participants reported any 
significant neurological or psychological disorder or the use of psychotropic medication. They 
received no compensation for their participation. This study was approved by the Ethics 
Committee of the University of Geneva. 
Materials 
Specificity Thinking Task (adapted from the AMT; Williams et al., 1996): 
This task assesses the ability to elaborate future events in a specific way. In response to a 
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series of 20 cue words written on cards that were presented one at a time, participants were given 
60 seconds per cue word to imagine and orally describe specific events that could reasonably 
happen to them in the close (i.e., 1 year) and the distant future (i.e., 5 years), depending on the 
condition (i.e., “Try to imagine and describe a specific future event that might happen to you in 
the next year [or in 5 years], relating to the word stairs”). Two sets (A and B) of 10 cue words 
each were built from Bonin et al.’s (2003) set such that the two sets were matched for 
imageability, frequency of use, concreteness, and length (confirmed by t-tests, all ps > .50). Each 
set consisted of five positive and five negative words (positive and negative cues differed 
significantly in emotional valence, F(1,20) = 965.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .99). There was no 
significant difference between the mean valence of positive cue words in sets A and B, nor 
between the mean valence of negative cue words in sets A and B, F(1,20) = 0.01, p = .92, ηp2 = 
.01 (for further details, see Table A in the Supplemental Material). Four pseudo-random 
presentation orders of cue words were generated and the assignment of sets A and B to the close 
or distant future condition was counterbalanced, as was the order of completion of the two 
conditions. Some examples were provided to illustrate what would or would not be considered as 
a specific event, and one or two practice trials (in case of failure in the first trial) were performed 
with neutral cue words (i.e., stairs and tap). Only during the trial phase were the participants 
prompted a second time to imagine a specific event if their first response was not specific (e.g., 
“Can you think of a specific episode?”). Participants were reminded of the instructions twice, 
after the presentation of five cue words in each condition.  
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Immediately after describing each generated event, participants filled in a questionnaire 
using 7-point Likert scales to assess the subjective attributes of their mental representation. More 
specifically, these scales measured the emotional valence (from –3 = negative to +3 = positive), 
amount of visual details (from 1 = none to 7 = a lot), and personal importance (from 1 = not at 
all to 7 = completely) of the imagined event, its vividness (from 1 = not at all to 7 = completely), 
and the associated feeling of pre-experiencing (1 = not at all to 7 = completely). We 
distinguished between vividness and the feeling of experiencing the future since it has been 
shown that one can vividly imagine fictitious events without necessarily having the sensation of 
pre-experiencing them (i.e., imagine what it would be like to experience a particular future 
situation, picturing the characters, setting, etc.) (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2012; de Vito, 
Gamboz, & Brandimonte, 2012). The ratings for visual details and vividness were averaged to 
create a Perceptual Index (Cronbach’s alpha estimate reliability was high at .79). 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011; French version by Monestès, 
Villatte, Mouras, Loas, & Bond, 2009): 
The AAQ-II is a one-dimensional 10-item questionnaire designed to measure experiential 
avoidance and acceptance. According to Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, and Strosahl (1996, p. 
1154), experiential avoidance is  
the phenomenon that occurs when a person is unwilling to remain in contact with particular private 
experiences (i.e., bodily sensations, emotions, thoughts, memories, behavioural predispositions) and takes steps to 
alter the form or frequency of these experiences or the contexts that occasion them” (a sample item indicating 
avoidance is “I worry about not being able to control my worries and feelings”).  
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In contrast, acceptance refers to the ability to cope with private events, especially ones 
with negative connotations (a sample item indicating acceptance is “It’s OK if I remember 
something unpleasant”). Participants indicate the extent to which each statement applies to them 
on a 7-point Likert scale (from 1 = never true to 7 = always true). For improved readability, we 
inverted the scoring, such that higher scores indicate higher experiential avoidance. In the present 
study, the Cronbach’s alpha was .67.  
Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire (CAQ; Gosselin et al., 2002; English validation by Sexton & 
Dugas, 2008): 
The CAQ is a 25-item questionnaire assessing people’s proneness to resort to five types 
of cognitive avoidance strategies. In this study, we were particularly interested in the Avoidance 
of Threatening Stimuli subscale (Cronbach’s α = .84), which assesses proneness to avoid stimuli 
likely to trigger unpleasant thoughts and comprises statements such as “I avoid people who make 
me think about things that I do not want to think about” and “Sometimes I avoid places that 
make me think about things I would prefer not to think about”. Participants indicate the extent to 
which each statement seems true of them on a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 = not at all typical to 
5 = completely typical). The higher the score, the more avoidant the participant is. 
Cognitive Evaluation Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ; Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001; 
French adaptation by Jermann, Van der Linden, d’Acremont, & Zermatten, 2006): 
The CERQ is a 36-item questionnaire designed to assess the use of nine different types of 
emotion-regulation strategies, both maladaptive (self-blame, rumination, catastrophizing and 
blaming others) and adaptive (acceptance, positive refocusing, focusing on planning, positive 
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reappraisal and putting into perspective). We were particularly interested in two adaptive 
emotion-regulation strategies: positive refocusing (i.e., positive and pleasant thoughts replace the 
original thought about an event; e.g., “I think of nicer things than what I have experienced”; 
Cronbach’s α = .83) and positive reappraisal (i.e., thoughts focusing on the purpose of an event 
and making positive sense of what happened; e.g., “I think I can learn something from the 
situation”; Cronbach’s α = .78). Participants indicate on a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 = almost 
never to 5 = almost always) the extent to which each statement applies to the way they usually 
deal with negative events. 
Centre for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977; French version by 
Führer & Rouillon, 1989): 
The CES-D is a 20-item questionnaire measuring depressive symptomatology. The scale 
assesses symptoms associated with depression and more particularly “depressed mood, feelings 
of guilt and worthlessness, feelings of helplessness and hopelessness, psychomotor retardation, 
loss of appetite and sleep disturbances” (Radloff, 1977, p. 386). Participants indicate the 
frequency at which they experienced some of these symptoms during the last week, on a 4-point 
Likert scale (from 0 = never, very rarely to 3 = frequently, all the time). The highest score 
indicates the presence of severe depressive symptomatology (Cronbach’s α = .66). 
We also examined the extent to which avoidance (AAQ-II and CAQ) and emotion-
regulation measures (positive reappraisal and positive refocusing of the CERQ) tapped into 
related or independent constructs. Measures of avoidance (AAQ-II * CAQ, r = .41, p < .001) 
were correlated, indicating that both measures tapped into the same construct despite a certain 
FUTURE THINKING AND AFFECT REGULATION IN AGEING 
15 
 
degree of independence, probably because these measures evaluate two different types of 
avoidance. The significant correlation between positive reappraisal and positive refocusing (r = 
.35, p < .001) also indicates that both emotion-regulation strategies tapped into the same 
construct, with a degree of independence. In addition, experiential avoidance was negatively 
correlated with positive reappraisal (AAQ-II * positive reappraisal, r = –.29, p < .01), indicating 
that the measures of avoidance and emotion-regulation strategies may evaluate two different 
ways of regulating emotions, one of which is considered “passive” (avoiding, disengaging) and 
the other “active” (confrontation, reappraisal). 
 
Coding of the responses to the Specificity Thinking Task  
The participants’ responses to the Specificity Thinking Task were classified into three 
categories, specific, non-specific and omission, which are described below. The first two 
response categories referred to potential future events, while events that were not future-oriented 
were classified as omissions. Responses referring to temporal windows that did not match those 
specified in the task (i.e., 1 year or 5 years) or referring to past events were discarded.  
The specific category comprised future events meeting the criteria of specificity 
developed by Williams et al. (1996) (i.e., events that might happen at a particular time and place 
and last no longer than a day; e.g., “A year from now, I would like to go to the ‘Papillorama’ 
exhibition with my grandson, and I picture us lying on the grass, looking at the butterflies flying 
above our heads on a warm afternoon”).  
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The non-specific category encompassed future events lasting more than a day (e.g., “I 
picture myself going back to Martinique for a few weeks with my family”), series of repeated 
events (e.g., “Five years from now, I think I will allow myself to eat biscuits every now and then; 
that’s my own little sin”), or abstract future thoughts (e.g., “Five years from now, I would like 
my emotional wound to be completely healed”).  
The omission category included, first, failure to produce an answer at all, and second, 
responses consisting in semantic associates of the cue word that neither referred to an event nor 
were future-oriented (e.g., “The first word that comes to my mind is dog”). Although in earlier 
studies conducted in non-clinical samples, responses consisting in omissions and semantic 
associates were usually classified as “non-specific” (e.g., Raes et al., 2003; Raes et al., 2006; but 
see also Raes, Hermans, Williams, & Eelen, 2007), we considered that participants, particularly 
older adults, might avoid facing threatening future events by making omission-type responses. 
Moreover, given the significant difference in the proportion of omission-type responses 
represented in our age groups (five times as high in older as in middle-aged adults; see Table 2), 
the choice was made to group them in a separate category.  
The number of discarded responses (i.e., thoughts that did not correspond to the temporal 
windows or temporal direction) varied across participants; in order to assess individuals’ 
proneness to be specific (or non-specific), we computed ratios of specific and non-specific 
responses over the total number of responses (excluding discarded responses) according to the 
formulas below: 
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Ratio of Specific Responses =   Number of Specific Responses 
Number of Cue Words – Number of Discarded Reponses 
 
Ratio of Non-Specific Responses =   Number of Non-Specific Responses 
     Number of Cue Words – Number of Discarded Reponses 
 
Ratio of Omissions =    Number of Omissions 
     Number of Cue Words – Number of Discarded Reponses 
 
The responses were classified by the first author and a random selection of 20% of the 
responses was scored by an independent trained rater, revealing good inter-rater reliability (Κ = 
.89 and agreement = 94%). 
 
Results 
Characteristics of responses on the Specificity Thinking Task  
Overall, participants provided a total of 2000 responses, of which 49 (2.45%) were 
discarded, since they referred to past events or to future temporal windows that did not match 
those specified in the instructions (i.e., 1 year or 5 years). Of the remaining 1951 responses, 64% 
described specific events, 30% non-specific events, and 6% were omissions (see upper section of 
Table 1 for descriptive data). Within the category of non-specific responses, 49% corresponded 
to abstract future thoughts, 37% described extended series of events and 14% were categorical. 
Within the category of omissions, 59% corresponded to an absence of response and 41% were 
semantic associates.  
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– INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE – 
Questionnaire results 
In order to examine the effects of gender on measures of emotion regulation, avoidance 
and depressive symptomology, as well as the possible interactions between gender and age on 
these measures, we conducted a series of two-way analysis of variances (ANOVAs) with age 
(older vs. middle-aged) and gender (male vs. female) as independent variables and scores for 
cognitive avoidance (avoidance of threatening stimuli subscale of the CAQ), experiential 
avoidance (AAQ-II), emotion-regulation strategies (positive refocusing and positive reappraisal) 
and depressive symptomatology (CES-D). 
For experiential avoidance (AAQ-II), a main effect of age was identified, F(1, 96) = 
6.34, p < .05, ηp2 = .06, with older adults scoring higher than middle-aged adults; there was also a 
main effect of gender, F(1, 96) = 9.8, p < .01, ηp2 = .09, with women scoring higher than men; 
but no significant interaction between age and gender, F(1, 96) = 2.70, p = .11, ηp2 = .03.  
For cognitive avoidance (CAQ), there was no significant main effect of age, F(1, 96) = 
0.62, p = .43, ηp2 = .006, but there was a significant effect of gender, F(1, 96) = 4.43, p < .05, ηp2 
= .04, with women displaying higher scores than men; there was no significant interaction 
between age and gender, F(1, 96) = 0.06, p = .81, ηp2 = .001.  
For positive reappraisal (CERQ), there was no significant effect of either age, F(1, 96) = 
0.26, p = .61, ηp2 = .003, or gender, F(1, 96) = 0.58, p = .45, ηp2 = .006, nor was there any 
significant interaction between age and gender, F(1, 96) = 0.33, p = .57, ηp2 = .003.  
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For positive refocusing (CERQ), there was no significant main effect of age, F(1, 96) = 
0.55, p = .46, ηp2 = .006, but there was a significant main effect of gender, F(1, 96) = 7.10, p < 
.01, ηp2 = .07, with women reporting more frequent use of positive refocusing than men; there 
was no significant interaction between age and gender, F(1, 96) = 0.12, p = .73, ηp2 = .001.  
For depressive symptomatology (CES-D), there was no significant main effect of age, 
F(1, 96) = 2.07, p = .15, ηp2 = .02, or gender, F(1, 96) = 1.37, p = .25, ηp2 = .01, nor was there an 
interaction between age and gender, F(1, 96) = 0.05, p = .82, ηp2 = .001. 
 
Age-related patterns of future thinking according to cue word valence and temporal distance 
To examine the effects of age, valence and temporal distance on both objective (i.e., types 
of events: specific, non-specific, omission-type response) and subjective (i.e., self-ratings) 
measures of future-oriented thoughts, several 2 (age: middle-aged vs. older adults) x 2 (valence: 
positive vs. negative) x 2 (temporal distance: 1 year vs. 5 years) ANOVAs with repeated 
measures on the last two factors were conducted. The distribution of specific, non-specific and 
omission-type responses within each temporal distance x cue word valence condition is 
presented in Table 2. In the following analysis, we report the significant and marginally 
significant interactions (p-values considered marginally significant when 0.05 < p < 0.10). (See 
Table B in the Supplemental Material for further results of the two-way and three-way 
interactions.) 
– INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE – 
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Objective measures of responses 
Specific responses 
We observed main effects only of age, F(1, 98) = 28.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .23, as older 
adults provided less specific responses than middle-aged adults; valence, F(1, 98) = 16.13, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .14, with participants providing more specific events in response to positive cue 
words; and temporal distance, F(1, 98) = 23.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .19, with participants providing 
more specific responses for the close than the distant future.  
Non-specific responses 
The analysis revealed main effects only of age, F(1, 98) = 15.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .14, as 
older adults provided more non-specific responses than middle-aged adults; valence, F(1, 98) = 
10.01, p < .01, ηp2 = .09, with participants providing more non-specific events in response to 
negative cue words; and temporal distance, F(1, 98) = 16.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .14, with 
participants providing more non-specific responses for the distant than the close future.  
Omissions 
The ANOVA showed a main effect only of age, F(1, 98) = 19.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .17; and 
a marginal effect of valence, F(1, 98) = 3.72, p = .06, ηp2 = .04. Older adults produced more 
omission responses than middle-aged adults, and participants in both age groups tended to make 
more omission responses when cue words were negative.  
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Subjective measures of responses 
Emotion 
The ratings for emotion were affected by valence, F(1, 98) = 553.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .85, 
as representations of future events produced in response to positive cue words were rated as 
more positive than in response to negative cue words. A marginal effect of temporal distance was 
also observed, F(1, 98) = 3.44, p = .07, ηp2 = .03, with events represented 1 year from the present 
being rated as more positive than events represented 5 years in the future.  
Perceptual Index 
The ratings for sensory-perceptual details were affected only by valence, F(1, 98) = 
157.23, p < .001, ηp2 = .62, indicating that representations of future events mentioned in response 
to positive cue words were rated as more vivid and associated with more visual details than 
representations of future events provided in response to negative cue words.  
Feeling of pre-experiencing 
For the feeling of pre-experiencing the events, there was a main effect only of valence, 
F(1, 98) = 107.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .52. These results indicate that representations of future events 
mentioned in response to positive cue words were associated with a stronger feeling of pre-
experiencing than representations of future events provided in response to negative cue words.  
Importance 
Finally, the ANOVA conducted on the ratings of importance of future events indicated 
main effects of age, F(1, 98) = 3.94, p < .05, ηp2 = .04; and valence, F(1, 98) = 143.57, p < .001, 
ηp
2
 = .59; and a significant interaction between valence and age, F(1, 98) = 3.99, p < .05, ηp2 = 
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.04. Participants rated future events provided in response to positive cue words as more 
important than events described in response to negative cue words. Tukey post hoc tests revealed 
that older adults rated future events to be more important than middle-aged adults did, and age-
related differences in the ratings for importance were greater for future events described in 
response to negative cue words. 
 
Relations between proneness to avoidance and the nature of future-oriented thoughts 
The correlations between individual differences in experiential avoidance (AAQ-II), 
cognitive avoidance (the avoidance subtest of the CAQ) and the nature of responses (i.e., ratios 
of specific, non-specific and omission responses), with depressive symptomatology (CES-D) 
computed as a covariate, are reported in Table 3, along with their 95% confidence interval (CI). 
Correlations were applied separately to each age group. The analyses of correlations were 
conducted on responses induced by both positive and negative cue words and compared for the 
two temporal windows (i.e., close vs. distant future) (see Table 3). 
– INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE – 
Correlation analyses conducted on responses induced by positive cue words did not 
reveal any significant relationship with measures of avoidance. 
In the distant future condition, the ratio of specific events induced by negative cue words 
was negatively correlated, in middle-aged participants, with proneness to experiential avoidance 
(AAQ-II), indicating that the more avoidant middle-aged participants produced less specific 
descriptions. No significant correlation was found in this distant future x negative cue word 
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condition between experiential avoidance and the ratio of specific events in older adults. A 
Steiger test (which evaluates whether correlation coefficients are significantly different in 
strength; Steiger, 1980) confirmed that the correlation in middle-aged adults between 
experiential avoidance and the ratio of specific events differed significantly from the correlation 
in older adults (p = .0075).  
In older adults, the ratio of omission-type responses in the distant future induced by 
negative cue words was positively correlated with the measure of cognitive avoidance (CAQ), 
whereas no significant correlation between cognitive avoidance and omission-type responses was 
found in middle-aged adults. A Steiger test confirmed that the correlation observed in older 
adults differed significantly from the correlation in middle-aged adults (p = .033). 
To assess the independent contributions of the propensity for experiential and cognitive 
avoidance (as measured respectively by the AAQ-II and the avoidance subscale of the CAQ) to 
the nature of future events presented in the distant future x negative cue word condition,1 we 
conducted a multiple regression analysis with age as a dummy-coded predictor variable (0 for 
middle-aged adults and 1 for older adults). The other predictor variables, scores on the AAQ-II, 
the avoidance subscale of the CAQ, and the CES-D, were mean-centred and their interactions 
                                                   
1
 In an exploratory test, we also examined the regressions between the various types of responses within each 
temporal distance x positive cue word condition (controlling for depressive symptomatology). The results indicate 
that no avoidance measure predicts the specificity or the number of omission-type responses induced by positive cue 
words. These results are presented in Table C of the Supplemental Material. 
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with age were examined (see Table D in the Supplemental Material for further results of these 
regression analyses).  
The ratio of specific events provided in the distant future was independently predicted by 
the participants’ age and tended to be predicted by the AAQ-II score in middle-aged people, 
t(95) = 1.86, p = .06, ß = –.32. The age x AAQ-II interaction, t(95) = 1.32, p = .19, ß = 0.21, 
indicated that experiential avoidance (AAQ-II) tended to contribute to the ratio of specific 
events, particularly in middle-aged adults, with a slope of ß = –.11 for older adults (see Figure 1).  
– INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE – 
The ratio of omission-type responses in the distant future was independently predicted by 
the participant’s age and by the CAQ score in older adults only, as shown by the significant 
interaction between age and CAQ, t(95) = 2.08, p < .05, ß = .28 (see Figure 2). 
– INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE – 
 
Relations between use of emotion-regulation strategies and subjective experience of future 
thinking 
The relationships between the positive refocusing and positive reappraisal strategies (as 
measured by the CERQ) and the ratings for subjective characteristics of thoughts, with 
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depressive symptomatology (CES-D) computed as a covariate,2 are reported in Table 4, along 
with their 95% CI. Correlations were applied separately to each age group.3  
Positive refocusing was positively correlated, in older adults, with the ratings for the 
feeling of pre-experiencing the future and importance, and marginally with the ratings for visual 
details and vividness (i.e., Perceptual Index). Although no significant correlation was identified 
in middle-aged participants between positive refocusing and the subjective qualities of future 
events, a Steiger test indicated that the correlations for older adults did not differ significantly 
from those for middle-aged adults (all ps > .19).  
Positive reappraisal positively correlated in both middle-aged and older adults with the 
ratings for the feeling of pre-experiencing the future. Furthermore, positive reappraisal was 
significantly correlated in middle-aged, but only marginally in older adults, with the ratings for 
visual details and vividness (i.e., Perceptual Index). A Steiger test indicated that the correlations 
between positive reappraisal and ratings for both visual details and vividness did not differ 
between age groups (both ps < .23). 
– INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE – 
                                                   
2
 Higher depressive symptomatology scores have been shown to be related to lower phenomenological qualities 
(vividness, auditory or spatial temporal details) accompanying future events, in healthy (Szőllősi, Pajkossy, & 
Racsmány, 2015) and dysphoric adults (Anderson & Evans, 2015). 
 
3
 Exploratory analyses were run on all the CERQ subtests to examine the association between adaptive vs. 
maladaptive strategies and subjective experience; see Table F in the Supplemental Material. 
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To assess the independent contribution of these emotion regulation strategies to the 
subjective experience of imagining future events, we conducted a general linear regression 
analysis with age as a dummy-coded predictor variable (0 for middle-aged and 1 for older 
adults). The other predictor variables, namely positive refocusing and positive reappraisal and 
the CES-D, were centred and the interactions between each one and age were examined (see 
Table E in the Supplemental Material for further results of these regression analyses). 
Positive reappraisal contributed to the ratings for the Perceptual Index in both middle-
aged, t(95) = 2.68, p < .01, ß = .37, and older adults, as shown by the absence of interaction 
between age and positive reappraisal, t(95) = 0.32, p = .68, ß = –.04, with a slope of ß = .33 for 
older adults. It also contributed to the feeling of experiencing the future in both middle-aged, 
t(95) = 2.01, p < .05, ß = .27, and older adults, as revealed by the lack of interaction between age 
and positive reappraisal, t(95) = 0.06, p = .85, ß = .03, with a slope of ß = .30 for older adults. 




Future thinking in older adults is characterised by a lack of specificity associated with an 
equal or even higher subjective experience of travelling through time than in young adults. The 
first objective of this study was to examine the influence of temporal distance and cue word 
valence on the specificity of imagined future events, in both middle-aged and older adults. 
Manipulating both the distance and the valence resulted in future conditions of varying degrees 
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of discomfort, allowing for the investigation, secondly, of whether proneness to avoidance could 
account for the lack of specificity in older adults when they project themselves into a distant 
future generated in response to negative cue words (since this condition is considered the most 
likely to induce uncomfortable future thoughts). We then examined the role of certain types of 
emotion-regulation strategies, namely positive focusing and positive reappraisal, in the 
subjective experience of future thinking.  
Manipulating both temporal distance and cue word valence proved to be a relevant 
approach in several respects since both factors influenced the nature of future-oriented thoughts 
(i.e., specific, non-specific, omissions) and the subjective experience of future thinking (i.e., the 
self-ratings). With regard to temporal distance, in both middle-aged and older adults, the distant 
future (i.e., 5 years), compared to the close future (i.e., 1 year), induced the generation of fewer 
specific thoughts and more non-specific future thoughts and omission-type responses; in 
addition, the associated ratings of mental representations were lower in terms of visual details. 
These findings are consistent with construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003), which 
proposed that, the greater the temporal distance, the more likely future events are to be 
represented in terms of a few abstract features, an assumption that has been widely confirmed in 
subsequent studies (e.g., Addis et al., 2008; Arnold, McDermott, & Szpunar, 2011; 
D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004).  
With regard to the valence of cue words, we found that positive cue words led to more 
intense ratings of mental representations for subjective characteristics than negative ones (i.e., 
emotion, visual details, vividness, feeling of experiencing and importance), in line with previous 
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studies (e.g., Gallo et al., 2011; Painter & Kring, 2015). In addition, positive cue words led to the 
production of more specific responses and fewer non-specific and omission-type responses. The 
latter finding is only partially supported by previous studies, for which some results were 
equivocal. For example, healthy participants were found to recall more specific memories in 
response to positive cue words in one study (Young et al., 2012), whereas other studies found no 
effect of cue word valence on the specificity of elaborated events (Gallo et al., 2011; Goddard, 
Dritschel, & Burton, 1996; Jones et al., 1999). In all the latter studies, however, although both 
valence and frequency of occurrence of cues were controlled, their levels of concreteness and 
imageability were seldom taken into consideration. Yet imageability of cues has been shown to 
mediate the specificity of personal memories in healthy young adults (Williams, Healy, & Ellis, 
1999). It is therefore possible that the inconsistencies in the results related to the effect of 
valence on specificity may be linked to the method employed to select cue words, as Van 
Vreeswijk and de Wilde (2004) suggested. Nevertheless, since the desirability of future events 
contributes to both the episodic richness and the ratings of subjective characteristics of imagined 
events (De Vito et al., 2015), one can reasonably expect future thoughts generated in response to 
positive cue words to be more desirable and hence to foster the imagining of more specific 
events in healthy participants. Finally, the findings complement the existing data on future 
thinking by comparing middle-aged and older adults; the latter exhibit lower levels of specificity 
in future thinking but similar subjective experiences of travelling through time, regardless of the 
temporal distance and the valence of cue words. 
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The relation between avoidance strategies and the nature of future-oriented thoughts was 
then addressed, with a focus on whether avoidance strategy accounted for the lack of future 
thinking specificity, especially in older adults. The results did indeed indicate a relationship 
between the nature of future-oriented thoughts and proneness to avoidance in both age groups, 
although they followed quite different patterns. In middle-aged adults, the level of experiential 
avoidance, as assessed by the AAQ-II, contributed negatively to the specificity of future thoughts 
set in a distant future and induced by negative cue words. This result extends previous findings 
on the role of experiential avoidance – unwillingness to be in contact with private and 
undesirable experiences (Hayes et al., 1996) – in the lack of memory specificity in both clinical 
(Kashdan et al., 2010; Raes et al., 2009; Spinhoven et al., 2009) and non-clinical samples 
(Hermans et al., 2005). In addition, the negative contribution of experiential avoidance to the 
specificity of future-oriented thoughts seems to confirm the assumption that reduced specificity 
could be a way of lessening the emotional impact of certain mental projections, not only when 
remembering past events (e.g., Hermans et al., 2008; Raes et al., 2003; Williams, 1996) but also 
when imagining future ones, at least in a distant future induced by negative cue words.  
In contrast, proneness to cognitive avoidance, as assessed by the avoidance of threatening 
stimuli subscale of the CAQ, which assesses the effort deployed to avoid situations that conjure 
up undesirable thoughts, contributed only in older adults to the number of omissions (i.e., lack of 
responses and semantic associates) of future-oriented thoughts, in a distant future induced by 
negative cue words, suggesting at first glance that the failure to respond may not necessarily and 
solely reflect an impairment (e.g., age-related changes in processing speed and/or strategic 
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retrieval) preventing a participant from answering within the allotted time, but may also result 
from an avoidance strategy triggered by threatening stimuli. The avoidance subtest of the CAQ, 
which includes items such as “I avoid people who make me think about things that I do not want 
to think about” and “Sometimes I avoid places that make me think about things I would prefer 
not to think about”, suggests the use of a proactive strategy fairly similar to situation selection 
(i.e., choosing the situations one encounters to avoid threats to one’s mood). Moreover, the 
relationship between this avoidance strategy and the number of omissions echoes recent findings 
that older adults are more efficient at withdrawing their attention from emotional information at 
an early stage, by using a disengagement strategy (e.g., distraction or denial; Blanchard-Fields, 
2007; Scheibe, Sheppes, & Staudinger, 2015). Indeed, compared to young adults, older adults 
facing a threat to their well-being have shown a preference for disengaging their attention from 
the negative information, which appears to be less effortful than strategies such as direct 
confrontation, which are more frequently used by young adults (Scheibe et al., 2015). We can 
therefore assume that avoiding generation of a future event in which a threat may be perceived 
by not responding to a prompt is less of an effort than transforming mental images into a future 
event, even in a non-specific way. Since it is plausible that the reduced efficiency of executive 
functions in ageing (Salthouse, 2010) may drive the most avoidant older adults to select the least 
effortful solution, namely omission, it would be particularly interesting to explore the extent to 
which executive functions and ruminative processes jointly participate in determining the nature 
of future-oriented thoughts (see CaRFAX Model; Williams, 2006).  
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One point to consider is that, in the present study, the use of avoidance strategies was 
only identified in the context of a supposed uncomfortable future (i.e., a distant future induced by 
negative cue words), in which the future events produced were rated as more negatively valenced 
(than those imagined in a close future induced by positive cue words) by both middle-aged and 
older adults. No relationship was identified between measures of avoidance and the nature of 
events produced either in the close future or in response to positive cue words. This finding 
confirms the assumption that in non-clinical samples the link between avoidance strategies and 
reduced memory specificity may be exhibited only under stressful conditions (Debeer et al., 
2012; Debeer et al., 2011). This point also indicates that both temporal distance and cue word 
valence should be carefully selected when investigating future thinking. In a recent study 
comparing depressed and healthy individuals, and using mainly positive cue words (cue list 
comprising positive, negative and neutral cue events, but 63% of which were rated as positive by 
independent raters) to induce memories and prospections, no relationship was identified between 
proneness to avoidance and the specificity of future events (Addis, Hach, & Tippett, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the authors proposed that the emotional valence of the cues may have modulated 
the nature of the relationship between avoidance and specificity. Although our study confirms 
this assumption, it also points to the importance of taking temporal distance into consideration, 
particularly when investigating ageing.  
Finally, we were interested in examining whether particular emotion-regulation strategies 
accounted for the subjective experience of travelling through time. In both middle-aged and older 
adults, an increased propensity to use positive reappraisal contributed to higher ratings for visual 
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details, vividness and feeling of experiencing the future. On the other hand, positive refocusing 
correlated with ratings for vividness, feeling of experiencing and importance of future events in 
both age groups. Whereas studies conducted in young adults showed that the subjective 
experience of future thinking was influenced by various factors (e.g., the time perspective, the 
sensory-perceptual qualities of the events, individual differences in self-consciousness; see 
Lehner & D’Argembeau, 2016), the present study adds to this list the need to consider the 
influence of positive reappraisal, and to a lesser extent positive refocusing, in both middle-aged 
and older adults. Adding to the assumption that older adults base their ratings of experiencing 
past and future events on their emotional values more than on their episodic attributes (Johnson 
et al., 2015), we propose that this emotional focus entails the use of specific emotion-regulation 
strategies. Finally, let us point out that in this study, very little difference was observed between 
the two age groups in terms of ratings for the subjective characteristics of future events, which 
may reflect a similar contribution by both positive reappraisal and positive refocusing in the two 
age groups. Since emotion regulation seems to improve as we age (e.g., Charles & Piazza, 2009; 
Scheibe & Carstensen, 2010; Urry & Gross, 2010), the possibility that the expected differences 
in the subjective characteristics and emotion-regulation strategies are hidden as a result of this 
development cannot be ruled out. These data, resulting from the comparison of middle-aged and 
older adults, should be complemented by observations in young versus older adults, which might 
reveal greater variability in emotion-regulation processes. 
Despite the contributions made by this work, some limitations must be acknowledged. In 
particular, the analyses did not pass the multiple comparison tests. It seems likely that the design 
FUTURE THINKING AND AFFECT REGULATION IN AGEING 
33 
 
of the study may have had an impact on this issue. We attempted to use an individual-differences 
approach, involving comparisons between participants in various conditions (i.e., x 4), and 
allowing a maximum of five observations per participant in each condition (i.e., total of 20 cue 
words spread over 4 conditions). The limited data set variability within each condition may very 
well have reduced the statistical power of the analyses. Future studies might favour different 
designs such as a pre- to post-stress exposure design (e.g., Debeer et al., 2012) or pre-select 
participants based on their proneness to avoidance (e.g., Raes et al., 2006). Nevertheless, we 
believe that these preliminary results are worthy of attention for several reasons. First, they are 
well backed up by the existing literature, especially the affect regulation hypothesis (Williams, 
1996), and they replicate previous findings on mental time travel into the past in healthy young 
adults, from which our hypothesis emerged. Second, the regression analyses are consistent with 
the correlation analyses and indicate that proneness to avoidance does indeed contribute to the 
nature of future thoughts. Third, although multiple comparison procedures allow for the 
detection of type I errors, they also increase the chance of producing type II errors (disregarding 
a valid relationship due to its failure to pass multiple comparisons). On this issue, the fact that 
equivalent results were observed in a subsequent study with a different design (i.e., significant 
relationships in middle-aged and older adults between proneness to avoidance and the specificity 
of emotional future thoughts in daily life; Jumentier, Barsics, D’Argembeau, & Van der Linden, 
2017) reinforces our opinion that, despite our results’ failure to pass some multiple comparison 
corrections in this study, they nonetheless deserve attention. Finally, the present study, which 
was intended as a preliminary and exploratory investigation, lacked the statistical power to 
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examine the link between emotion-regulation strategies and the subjective qualities of future 
thoughts according to their valence. Since proneness to avoidance appears to be related not only 
to the specificity of future thoughts in middle-aged adults but also to omissions in older adults, 
the possibility cannot be ruled out that avoidance shapes future thinking in variable ways and 
that subjective experience may be one of them. This approach may be of particular interest 
because of what it offers in terms of the applicability of the affect regulation hypothesis.  
Another limitation that can be raised relates to the fact that, although the older adults 
were reasonably well educated, socially active, and involved in various activities and community 
associations, no cognitive measure was administered to ensure that their cognitive functioning 
was preserved. Such a measure would have allowed the examination of cognitive measures that 
tap into certain executive abilities and the extent to which executive functions and avoidance 
individually or jointly account for the lower specificity of future thinking.  
Notwithstanding its limitations, this study presents an interesting new finding, namely 
that the affect regulation hypothesis (Williams, 1996), which posits that lack of memory 
specificity serves an avoidance function, also applies to the imagination of future events under 
particular conditions. Indeed, in the context of a distant future induced by negative cues, 
proneness to experiential avoidance predicts the defect of future thinking specificity, in middle-
aged adults. In older adults, proneness to cognitive avoidance contributes to the omission of 
distant and negatively connoted future thoughts. It is possible that this relationship between 
avoidance and the non-elaboration of future events in older adults stems from the perception of a 
threat of some kind involved in the process of projecting oneself into a distant future induced by 
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negative cue words, that is to say, close to the limits of older adults’ temporal perspective and 
probably characterised by negatively connoted events (see Bulley, Henry, & Suddendorf, 2017, 
for a discussion of threat and future thinking). Added to the fact that distant future and negative 
cues generally restrain both the specificity and subjective experience of future thinking, these 
results suggest that temporal distance and valence should be carefully taken into consideration 
when investigating future thinking, especially in aging. Together with the findings that the use of 
positive reappraisal and positive refocusing (to a lesser extent) enhances the subjective 
experience of future thinking in both age groups, this study indicates that how individuals project 
themselves into their personal future also relies on affect- and emotion-regulation strategies, 
which should not be overlooked.  
This line of work, indicating that future thinking in ageing is modulated by emotional 
factors, should be complemented by studies of an episodic specificity induction (Madore, 
Gaesser, & Schacter, 2014) on older adults’ affect, since when this kind of training is applied to 
young adults’ perceptions of personal future worrisome events, it has been shown to increase 
well-being, the perception of a greater likelihood of positive outcomes and the use of active 
coping (Jing, Madore, & Schacter, 2016). It therefore seems relevant to investigate the impact of 
specificity training on older adults’ well-being or use of coping strategies, in a context where the 
worrisome events likely to be pictured probably differ considerably between young and older 
adults. 
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Characteristics of Responses to the Specificity Thinking Task and Mean Ratings for Phenomenal 
Characteristics 
***p < .001; ** p < .01; and * p < .05. 
Middle-aged adults Older adults t-Value 
 
(N = 51) (N = 49)  
 M SD M SD  
Objective measures (%)      
Specific responses  74% (18) 52% (21) 5.33*** 
Non-specific responses 23% (17) 37% (18) 3.92*** 
Omission-type responses 2% (5) 11% (11) 4.37*** 
Mean ratings      
Emotion 0.79 (0.55) 0.71 (0.66) 0.66 
Perceptual Index 4.75 (0.79) 4.96 (0.95) 1.23 
Feeling of experiencing 4.56 (0.93) 4.89 (1.15) 1.56 
Importance 3.85 (0.81) 4.21 (0.96) 2.04* 




Types of Responses within Each Temporal Distance x Cue Word Valence Condition, in Middle-Aged and Older Adults (Distribution) 
 
  Specific responses   Non-specific responses   Omission-type responses 
      
 
Middle-aged 
adults  Older adults   
Middle-aged 
adults  Older adults   
Middle-aged 
adults  Older adults 
  M (%) SD   M (%) SD   M (%) SD   M (%) SD   M (%)  SD   M (%) SD 
Distant future – negative cue words 65 28  47 30  31 28  42 29  4 11  11 16 
Distant future – positive cue words 75 26  48 27  23 25  43 25  2 7  9 16 
                  
Close future – negative cue words 73 20  54 25  23 18  37 23  4 8  9 14 
Close future – positive cue words 84 20   64 27   16 19   28 26   0 4   8 16 
 




Correlations between Measures of Avoidance and the Nature of Responses (Ratios) Induced by Negative and Positive Cue Words at 
Both Temporal Distances, Controlling for Depressive Symptomatology 
 
AAQ-II CAQ 
Nature of thoughts  
Middle-aged adults Older adults Middle-aged adults Older adults 
Negative cue words         
Specific – 5 years –0.29* (–0.56, 0.02)  –0.00 (–0.29, 0.29) –0.18 (–0.45, 0.10) –0.11 (–0.40, 0.17) 
Non-specific – 5 years 0.23 (–0.04, 0.51) –0.12 (–0.41, 0.16) 0.19 (–0.08, 0.47) –0.05 (–0.34, 0.24) 
Omissions – 5 years 0.15 (–0.13, 0.42) 0.23 (–0.05, 0.51) –0.04 (–0.33, 0.23) 0.32* (0.05, 0.59) 
Specific – 1 year –0.20 (–0.53, 0.01) 0.02 (–0.27, 0.31) –0.12 (–0.39, 0.17) 0.15 (–0.14, 0.43) 
Non-specific – 1 year 0.15 (–0.12, 0.43) –0.14 (–0.42, 0.15) 0.10 (–0.19, 0.37) –0.13 (–0.42, 0.15) 
Omissions – 1 year 0.20 (0.06, 0.59) 0.19 (–0.09, 0.47) 0.07 (–0.21, 0.35) –0.04  (–0.33, 0.24) 
Positive cue words         




Note: 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses. *Correlations significant at p < .05; and marginally significant p-values are 
in italics. Correlations for this analysis did not pass multiple comparison corrections (False Discovery Rate; Benjamini & Hochberg, 
1995), with all lines meeting p < .05 uncorrected.  
  
Specific – 5 years –0.07 (–0.35, 0.21) –0.01 (–0.29, 0.28) –0.09 (–0.37, 0.19) 0.01 (–0.27, 0.30) 
Non-specific – 5 years 0.03 (–0.25, 0.31) –0.09 (–0.38, 0.20) 0.08 (–0.20, 0.36) 0.02 (–0.27, 0.30) 
Omissions – 5 years 0.16 (–0.12, 0.44) 0.14 (–0.14, 0.43) 0.07 (–0.21, 0.35) –0.05 (–0.33, 0.24) 
Specific – 1 year 0.11 (–0.16, 0.39) 0.09 (–0.19, 0.38) –0.12 (–0.40, 0.16) 0.13 (–0.16, 0.41) 
Non-specific – 1 year –0.07 (–0.35, 0.28) –0.23 (–0.51, 0.05) 0.08 (–0.20, 0.36) –0.16 (–0.44, 0.13) 
Omissions – 1 year –0.20 (–0.48, 0.07) –0.21 (–0.06, 0.49) 0.19 (–0.09, 0.46) 0.05 (–0.24, 0.33) 




Correlations between Emotion-Regulation Strategies and Ratings (Means) for Subjective Characteristics of Future-Oriented Thoughts, 
Controlling for Depressive Symptomatology 
Note: 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses. *Correlations significant at p < .05; and ** p < .01. In bold: correlations 
that passed multiple comparison corrections (False Discovery Rate; Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). 
 
Positive refocusing Positive reappraisal  
Self-ratings Middle-aged adults Older adults Middle-aged adults Older adults 
Emotion 0.15 (–0.12, 0.43) 0.24  (–0.04, 0.52) 0.10 (–0.18, 0.38) 0.13 (–0.16, 0.41) 
Perceptual Index 0.24 (–0.06, 0.49) 0.28 (0.01, 0.52) 0.40** (0.11, 0.63) 0.28 (0.01, 0.54) 
Feeling of pre-experiencing 0.18 (–0.10, 0.45) 0.35* (0.09, 0.62) 0.31* (0.04, 0.58) 0.29* (0.02, 0.57) 
Importance 0.23 (–0.04, 0.50) 0.37** (0.10, 0.63) 0.23 (–0.04, 0.51) 0.18 (–0.10, 0.46) 




Specificity of Events Imagined in the Distant Future Induced by Negative Cues, as a Function of 









Ratios of Omission-Type Responses for the Distant Future Induced by Negative Cues, as a 
Function of Cognitive Avoidance, Controlling for Depressive Symptomatology 
 
 
